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STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS: CONTINUING UN-
CERTAINTIES AND A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
WILLIAM H. PAINTERt
RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER of corporate stock have
become almost an indispensable feature of the so-called "close"
corporation in modern times, but the problem of their validity has by
no means been wholly resolved. Generally speaking, a restriction on
transfer is any condition or limitation which qualifies the right of a
stockholder to alienate his interest in a corporation. It may take the
form of an absolute prohibition of transfer, a prohibition of transfer
to designated individuals or members of a class, or a condition that
no transfer will be effective unless the stockholder first offers the
stock to the corporation or its stockholders. The latter type restriction
is frequently referred to as a right of "first refusal" or "first option".
It may be perpetual or limited in time, and purport to bind only stock-
holders assenting to it or made applicable to transferees. The num-
ber of possible variations and combinations of restrictions is vir-
tually without limit, and the validity of particular restrictions depends,
at least in part, upon their form as well as upon the circumstances
under which they are sought to be enforced.'
The reasons why corporations or stockholders may seek to im-
pose restrictions upon the transfer of shares are nearly as diverse as
the forms the restrictions themselves may take. Most frequent, per-
haps, is the wish to confine ownership of the corporation, and the
management which results from ownership, to a relatively few persons
who may be closely related to one another and familiar with and
friendly to the policies and purposes of the corporation. Some types
of restrictions may reflect a desire to perpetuate various advantages
of operating a business as a partnership and yet benefit from the
protections afforded by doing business in the corporate form. Other
restrictions may be designed primarily to prevent shares from falling
into the hands of competitors, or descending to next-of-kin or legatees
tAssociate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. A.B. 1950,
Princeton University; LL.B. 1954, Harvard University.
1. For a useful summary and classification of the most frequently used types
of restrictions, see O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corpo-
rations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. Rsv. 773, 776 (1952).
(48)
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of former stockholders who may be unsympathetic to present manage-
ment.
The law with respect to the validity and effect of restrictions on
transfer of stock has developed, at least in this country, in a con-
fused and piecemeal fashion. For the most part, it is case law.' The
decisions are largely based upon supposed requirements of "public
policy,"' but the "policy" itself has rarely been fully enunciated, and
the reasons behind it and requiring its application to corporate stock
are seldom analyzed in a very satisfactory way, from either an his-
torical or a strictly technical standpoint. On the other hand, the re-
sults reached by the courts have usually been defensible on the basis
of common sense, at least if the fundamental assumptions behind
the decisions are accepted without criticism. Generally speaking, these
assumptions are: first, that stock in a corporation is "personal prop-
erty" and, second, that restrictions on alienation of "personal prop-
erty," and hence on corporate stock, should be regarded with disfavor.
The first of the above assumptions is less subject to doubt than
the second due to the fact that many corporation statutes expressly
provide that stock in a corporation is "personal property" and trans-
ferable in the same manner as "personal property."4 This has caused
2. Among the useful discussions of problems in this area are the following:
BALLANTINF, CORPORATIONS §§ 336-38 (rev. ed. 1946) ; 12 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 5452-58 (rev. vol. 1957); 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 7.01-29 (1958) ; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 129 (2d ed. 1949);
Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L. REv.
229 (1951); Hayes, Corporation Cake With Partnership Frosting, 40 IowA L. REv.
157 (1954); Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953) ; O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely
Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 (1952). The
following student notes are particularly helpful: 44 CORNELL L.Q. 133 (1958); 42
HARV. L. REv. 555 (1929); 45 MICH. L. REv. 779 (1947); 30 MICH. L. REv. 766
(1932) ; 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1949); 26 VA. L. REv. 354 (1940); 68 YALE L.J.
773 (1959). Additional references to valuable secondary sources are contained in
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE. op. cit. supra § 7.01 n.1 and
Hayes, supra at 157 n.3. Numerous cases are collected in the following annotations:
61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958) ;'2 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948); 138 A.L.R. 647 (1942); 65
A.L.R. 1159 (1930).
3. "Public policy is a very unruly horse and when once you get astride it you
never know where it will carry you." Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 481, 67 A.2d
56, 58 (Sup. Ct. 1949), quoting from Burrough, J., in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing.
229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C.P. 1824). The Tracey case involved a restraint
on transfer of voting trust certificates, rather than stock, but the court's reasoning
is characteristic: "Insofar as concerns restraints upon the alienation of personal
property, and in particular of corporate stock, while an owner, in exercising legally
permissible freedom to deal with his property, may enter into many transactions
which have the effect of restraining its transferability for temporary periods in the
future, nevertheless, arbitrary restraints on alienation are forbidden and unless re-
straints are imposed for purposes recognized as sufficient, they will be held invalid."
(Id. at 484, 67 A.2d at 59). The restraint, which was to extend for a period of
ten years, was held invalid. Compare Tracey, supra, with Lawson v. Household
Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 At. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
4. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159 (1953) : "The shares of stock in every cor-
poration shall be deemed personal property and transferable as provided in sub-
chapter VI of this chapter . .. ."
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many courts to make the further inference that, since historically
restraints on alienation of at least some forms of "personal property"
have for reasons of public policy been discouraged or prohibited by
law, and since stock is declared by statute to be "personal property,"
it must be freely alienable.
But not all courts have thought this way. Holmes, when Chief
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, observed, in
a classic and frequently quoted opinion:'
"Stock in a corporation is not merely property. It also creates a
personal relation analogous otherwise than technically to a partner-
ship. Notwithstanding decisions under statutes . . . there seems
to be no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's
associates in a corporation than in a firm."
Reasoning such as the above is perhaps more in sympathy with the
tendency of English courts to enforce restrictions on transfer if they
may be upheld under fundamental principles of contract law, despite
the analogy between stock and personal property.6 However, in this
country, and in the face of statutes which expressly declare stock to
be personal property, courts may be less free to emphasize the con-
tractual, at the expense of the property-like characteristics of stock.
Yet it need not necessarily follow that a policy against restraints on
alienation which historically may have had its original applicability
with regard to chattels and certain other forms of personal property
must ipso facto apply to corporate stock because of a legislative determi-
nation that it is personal property.'
5. Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902).
6. See Gower, Some Contrasts Between British And American Corporation
Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1377-78 (1956). The author observes that the English
have never been burdened with the American notion that stock is "property" the
alienation of which cannot be unreasonably restrained. John Chipman Gray was
apparently in agreement with the English view and with that of Holmes in the
Barrett case, supra note 5. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 24
(2d ed. 1895).
7. See Note, 45 MICH. L. Rev. 779, 780 (1947), arguing that the validity of
restraints should not be determined by criteria applicable to other forms of personal
property: "Given the premise that a share of stock is a property interest, the analogy
that unreasonable restrictions on transferability are unreasonable restraints on the
alienation of property in the estate sense may be too easily and irrationally drawn."
The writer suggests as an alternative criterion a determination of whether the
restraint constitutes "such a severe burden on the stockholder's freedom of disposi-
tion that he has no reasonable way out of the business unit." Another writer has
suggested that the test should be based upon the intentions of the parties: "Theoreti-
cally, the employee could contract away all his rights as a shareholder. The relevant
inquiry is not whether an agreement is a restriction on alienation but whether the
situation before the court was the intended'result of the agreement actually made."
Note, 68 YALE L.J. 773, 777 n.26 (1959). See also Note, 16 U. CHI. L. REv.
742 (1949) and Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 133, 134 (1958). The latter adopts an
intermediate position and suggests that permissible restrictions on stock transfers
might be more severe than those allowed with respect to other forms of personal
property and yet should not be as broad as permissible restrictions on assignment of
contract rights.
[VOL. 6: p. 48
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Most of the early cases in this area give relatively little indication
of how the public policy relating to restraints generally became appli-
cable to corporate stock, and they are even less helpful for their
reasoning. Many of them concern the question of whether a bank or
other financial institution may prohibit transfer of its stock by one who
has become indebted to it, either directly by way of a loan, or in-
directly due to a guarantee or endorsement of commercial paper
which the bank has taken at a discount. As to the validity of such
restrictions, the authorities are in apparent conflict from the earliest
times, the tendency having been, if anything, to enforce the restriction
if it were contained in the charter." Provisions in the charter and in
the by-laws restraining transfer by a debtor-stockholder were expressly
permitted, with respect to national banks, by the Currency Act of 1863,'
but the relevant passage of the statute was repealed in the following
year.'0 The Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the re-
peal as a legislative determination of the inherently evil nature of
restraints of this type, at least when applied to banking institutions,
regarding them as promoting "secret liens" and depriving depositors
and other creditors of the safety of their investment to the extent
that capital may be reduced by retirement of the stock belonging to the
debtor upon cancellation of his indebtedness."
The extent to which the cases relating to national banks in-
fluenced courts called upon to determine the validity of similar re-
strictions with respect to state banks is not entirely clear, but from
8. E.g., Dempster Mfg. Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa 80, 101 N.W. 735 (1904);
Gibbs v. Long Island Bank, 83 Hun. 92, 31 N.Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd
inem., 151 N.Y. 657, 46 N.E. 1147 (1897). See also ANGELL & Ames, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 381-86 (4th ed. 1852) ; 1 COOK, CORPORATIONS § 408 (4th ed. 1898)
and 2 COOK, CORPORATIONS § 621a (4th ed. 1898).
9. Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, § 36, 12 Stat. 675.
10. Currency Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 62, 13 Stat. 118.
11. First Nat'l Bank v. Lanier, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 369 (1871). The Currency
Act of 1864 provided merely that banks were to have the power to prescribe the
manner in which stock was transferable on their books. This was held insufficient
to authorize the imposition of a restriction on transfer of stock held by a debtor-
stockholder. In addition, the Currency Act of 1864 contained a provision prohibiting
a bank from making a loan or discount on shares of its capital stock and from
purchasing its own shares except to prevent loss in connection with a debt pre-
viously contracted in good faith, with a further direction that any shares so
purchased be sold within six months. These provisions were relied upon by the
Court in establishing a congressional intent to prohibit banks from lending to
stockholders on the collateral of their own stock and from purchasing the same
except under the conditions set forth in the Act. The same result was subse-
quently reached by the Court in Bullard v. Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 589 (1873).
Accord, Evansville Nat'l Bank v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 8 Fed. Cas. 891 (No.
4573) (C.C.D. Ind. 1871): Conklin v. Second Nat'l Bank, 45 N.Y. 655 (1871);
Feckheimer v. Nat'l Exchange Bank, 79 Va. 80 (1884). Cf., Rosenback v. Salt
Springs Nat'l Bank, 53 Barb. 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) (relying primarily on an
absence of authorization in the charter and not on the Currency Act of 1864).
Contra, In re Dunkerson, 8 Fed. Cas. 48 (No. 4156) (D. Ind. 1868). The Dunker-
son holding may be erroneous in view of the later decision in Lanier, supra, unless
the fact that the plaintiff in Dunkerson was the stockholder's assignee in bankruptcy,
FALL 1960]
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the manner in which the various opinions cite and rely upon one
another as authorities, it is likely that the decisions based upon
federal law reinforced to a considerable degree any existing disfavor
with which restraints of at least this particular variety were regarded. 2
Similar reasoning was then applied not only to state banks but to the
numerous industrial enterprises which were growing up throughout
the nation. It was perhaps characteristic of the mood of the expanding
economy that the interests of the market-place, favoring the free
transfer of securities and other property interests, should prevail over
rights based on ownership which confer on the owner the power to
keep his property out of the flow of commerce as long as he may
wish.'8
While the decisions almost invariably justify the results reached
by an appeal to a supposed "public policy" against restraints, recourse
is often had to various statutes as well, although courts have hardly
been consistent as to the manner in which the statutes should be con-
strued. If any tendency is discernible it has been to assume the appli-
and thus entitled to no rights superior to those which the stockholder would have
had, may be a distinguishing feature. A later holding distinguished Lanier on the
ground that there no express authority was given in the charter for the restriction,
whereas in the later case the charter expressly authorized the restriction. Knight
v. Old Nat'l Bank, 14 Fed. Cas. 772 (No. 7885) (C.C.D.R.I. 1871). In addition,
the court took the position that the Currency Act of 1864 merely prohibited a bank
from taking its own stock as collateral for a loan or discount made at the time of
the pledge and did not prohibit restrictions on transfer of stock by those who were
indebted to the bank. In view of the earlier Lanier holding, the case is doubtful.
12. Anglo-Californian Bank v. Grangers' Bank, 63 Cal. 359 (1883) ; Bryon v.
Carter, 22 La. Ann. 98 (1870); Bank of Atchison County v. Durfee, 118 Mo. 431,
24 S.W. 133 (1893); Carroll v. Mullanphy Savings Bank, 8 Mo. App. 249 (1880);
Driscoll v. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y. 96 (1874) ; Bank of Attica v.
Mfrs. & Traders' Bank, 20 N.Y. 501 (1859). Cf., Moore v. Bank of Commerce, 52
Mo. 377 (1873). 'Contra, Pendergast v. Bank of Stockton, 19 Fed. Cas. 135 (No.
10918) (C.C.D. Cal. 1871); Cunningham v. Alabama Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ala.
652 (1843) ; Tuttle v. Walton, 1 Ga. 43 (1846) ; Farmers' & Traders' Bank v.
Haney, 87 Iowa 101, 54 N.W. 61 (1893) ; Bronson Electric Co. v. Rheubottom, 122
Mich. 608, 81 N.W. 563 (1900) ; Spurlock v. Pacific R.R., 61 Mo. 319 (1875);
Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 45 Mo. 513 (1870) ; St. Louis Perpetual Ins.
Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149 (1845); United Cigarette Machine Co. v. Brown,
119 Va. 813, 89 S.E. 850 (1916) (restriction expressly authorized by charter). Cf.,
Costello v. Portsmouth Brewing Co., 69 N.H. 405, 43 At. 640 (1898). Even where
the restriction was not contained in the charter or by-laws, but was set forth on
the stock certificate, it was occasionally enforced. Jennings v. Bank of California,
79 Cal. 323, 21 Pac. 852 (1889) ; Vansands v. Middlesex County Bank, 26 Conn.
144 (1857). In some cases restrictions have been upheld as expressly authorized by
statute. See, e.g., Union Bank v. Laird, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 390 (1817) ; In re
Thornton, 7 F. Supp. 613 (D. Colo. 1934) ; Madison Bank v. Price, 79 Kan. 289,
100 Pac. 280 (1909) ; In the Matter of Starbuck, 251 N.Y. 439, 167 N.E. 580 (1929),
construing N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 66, permitting the directors to refuse transfer
by a stockholder who is indebted to a corporation if Section 66 or "the substance
thereof" is written or printed upon the stock certificate. This provision may
shortly be eliminated in the proposed general revision of the New York law with
respect to business corporations. See proposed N.Y. Business Corporation Law, S.
Int. 3124, Pr. No. 3316 (1960) and Rohrlich, New York's Proposed Business Corpo-
ration Law, 15 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 309, 312 (1960).
13. See the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bank v.
Lanier, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 369, 377 (1871).
[VOL. 6: p. 48
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cability of a policy against restraints on alienation and to conclude
that such restraints should be permissible only to the extent that they
have been expressly authorized by statute. 14 A few courts, on the other
hand, although acknowledging the existence of the policy, have taken
the position that reasonable restraints are permissible in the absence of
some statutory provision expressly prohibiting them.'5 Other cases
have stressed the significance of a limited statutory permission to adopt
by-laws with respect to particular subjects, including a narrow power
to "regulate" transfers of stock (the term "regulate" being frequently
interpreted as relating merely to the mechanical aspects of stock trans-
fers), and have held that by-laws with respect to matters not enumer-
ated in the statute are prohibited, particularly where they have the
effect of restraining, rather than merely "regulating" transfers. 6
14. See, e.g., Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 336, 340 (1878),
where the court said, with regard to a restriction making transfers subject to the
approval of the board of directors, "As the restriction is not imposed by express
authority of the statute of the State, it cannot . . . be enforced." In Driscoll v. West
Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y. 96, 105 (1874), the court, in holding invalid
a by-law restriction against transfer of stock by a debtor and construing a statutory
provision authorizing by-laws for "the regulation of . . . [the company's] affairs,
and for the transfer of its stock," observed that, if it had been intended to authorize
by-laws restricting, rather than merely regulating, transfers, "from the nature of the
right to be affected, and the favor which that right has met with from the law,
[this] would be plainly expressed when intended to be given." See also Kretzer v.
Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W. 1066 (1916) (The opinion
indicates that, although previous decisions had taken the view that restrictions may be
valid if expressly authorized by the charter, express authorization must be found in
the statute as well; a statutory provision similar to that in Driscoll, supra, was held to
relate exclusively to the formalities of transfer and not to authorize the imposition of
restrictions.) ; O'Brien v. Cummings, 13 Mo. App. 197 (1883). A more recent case
in Ohio has taken somewhat the same position, although holding a restriction valid
as a contract between the stockholders. First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op.
359, 73 N.E.2d 93 (C.P. 1945).
15. In Mason v. Mallard Telephone Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 1079, 240 N.W. 671:
672 (1932), where a statute gave the corporation power to "render the interests of
the shareholders transferable," the court argued that, "If the Legislature had in-
tended to provide that no restriction should be placed upon the transferability of
stock, it might well have found unmistakable English with which to announce such
intention." The case is noted in 18 IOWA L. Rev. 88 (1932). See also Jennings
v. Bank of California, 79 Cal. 323, 21 Pac. 852 (1889); Dempster Mfg. Co. v.
Downs, 126 Iowa 80, 101 N.W. 735 (1904). In Massachusetts, the presence of a
provision in the statute requiring the articles of incorporation to set forth the
restrictions, if any, imposed upon . . . transfer [of the shares]" has been construed
as an implied grant of authority to place restrictions on alienation. See, e.g., Long-
year v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914). The language in the
statute appeais to be tenuous justification for the results reached in some of the
cases. See note 20 infra, and Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121
N.E.2d 850 (1954), discussed in text accompanying note 46 infra. The Massa-
chusetts courts have traditionally inclined toward a contractual view of the problem
of restraints on alienation, such as that adopted in England. See Gower, supra
note 6, and the opinion of Holmes, C.J., in Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63
N.E. 934 (1902). See also Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102,
110, 168 N.E. 521, 525 (1929): "The absence of definite statutory limitations upon
the power to impose such restrictions must be taken as a legislative determination
that considerable latitude in this particular is permissible."
16. Steele v. Farmers' & Merchants' Mutual Telephone Ass'n, 95 Kan. 580,
148 Pac. 661 (1915); Lufkin Rule Co. v. Secretary of State, 163 Mich. 30, 127
N.W. 784 (1910); Ireland v. Globe Milling & Reduction Co., 19 R.I. 180, 32 Atl.
921 (1895).
FALL 1960]
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Reasoning of this sort seems as tenuous as that of decisions which
conclude, from an absence of any express statutory reference to re-
strictions, that they must therefore be permissible.'
The result reached by the cases first mentioned appears to be the
more sensible one, at least if it be assumed that the traditional re-
luctance of the law to enforce restraints on alienation should extend
to shares of stock, yet it would be preferable to place little, if any,
reliance either upon the absence of an express statutory provision
relating to restrictions, or upon provisions which may refer to restric-
tions but do so merely in an incidental or ambiguous fashion.
As stated previously, the basic question is whether a doctrine
which relates primarily to real and tangible personal property should
be applied to stock, which, although expressly declared by many
statutes to be personal property, also has some of the characteristics
of a contract."' Some of the early cases recognize this,1" but for the
mosIt part courts have been content to equate stock and personal prop-
erty and apply a supposed public policy against restraints, with little
or no analysis of any competing considerations which may arise from
an equally significant policy of promoting the freedom of persons to
enter into contractual relationships.
Generally speaking, absolute restrictions of various sorts are held
invalid. Thus restrictions requiring the consent of the corporation,
17. For an interesting non-sequitur, see the reasoning in Steele v. Farmers' &
Merchants' Mutual Telephone Ass'n., supra note 16, at 590, 148 Pac. at 665, to the
effect that the "rule" has been that corporate power must be "clearly granted, either
by express terms [of the statute] or by necessary implication. When the corporation,
as a factor in the economic life of the state, was the subject of much popular criticism,
the rule was adhered to. Now that the corporate form of organization is freely
resorted to by all classes of people, the rule will not be departed from."
18. Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902).
19. Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910)
Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 Atl. 488 (1903). In the Nicholson case, the
court, in enforcing a "first refusal" option, remarked with apparent sarcasm, "It does
not appear to have been deemed necessary in these cases to demonstrate that the
right to alienate property should be more highly regarded than the right to make
contracts respecting it. By the assumption that it should be, a task of much obvious
difficulty has been avoided." Supra at 110-11, 91 N.E. at 994. In Fitzsimmons the
reasoning is reminiscent of Barrett v. King, supra note 18, decided one year earlier,
the court observing, with respect to a first option among shareholders exercisable
in case of death or retirement, "Such agreements are quite common among partners
as to their shares in the firm assets, and are enforced by courts without hesitation. No
reason of overruling public policy is apparent why they should not also be sustained
in relation to shares of stock in what is really only a private trading corporation."
Supra at 82-3, 54 Atl. at 489. The argument that small, privately held corporations
should be treated differently was made in In re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401, 29 N.W. 582
(1886) and was rejected. See also Miller v. Farmers' Milling & Elevator Co., 78
Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 995 (1907), following the reasoning of the Klaus case. Simi-
larly, in Johnson v. Laflin, 13 Fed. Cas. 758, 761 (No. 7393) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878),
aff'd, 103 U.S. 800 (1880), the court, in speaking of the freely alienable character of
corporate stock as distinct from partnership interests, which require a dissolution
of an old partnership and the formation of a new one upon a change in the number or
identity of the partners, remarked, "Indeed, it is one of the leading objects of an
incorporated body to avoid the operation and effect of this doctrine of the law of
partnership. Accordingly, in this country shares in corporations are universally bought
and sold without reference to the consent of the other shareholders."
[VOL. 6: p. 48
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through its board of directors or otherwise,2° or all or a specified
percentage of its stockholders, 2 are generally unenforceable, as well
as prohibitions against transfer to competitors or other classes of per-
sons.2 On the other hand, so-called "first options" or "first refusals"
20. People ex rel. Malcolm v. Lake Sand Corp., 251 Ill. App. 499 (1929);
Douglas v. Aurora Daily News Co., 160 Ill. App. 506 (1911); Finch v. Macoupin
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 146 Ill. App. 158 (1908) ; Farmers' & Merchants' Bank
v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 336 (1878); Steele v. Farmers' & Merchants' Mutual Tele-
phone Ass'n., 95 Kan. 580, 148 Pac. 661 (1915); Miller v. Farmers' Milling &
Elevator Co., supra note 19; Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Machine Co., 81 N.J. Eq.
256, 86 At. 1026 (Ch. 1913); State ex rel. Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138
Wash. 144, 244 Pac. 261 (1926). See Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d
56 (Sup. Ct. 1949). The Tracey case is noted in 37 Gto. L.J. 444 (1949) ; 25 IND. L.J.
56 (1949); 48 MICH. L. Rev. 723 (1950) ; 23 TuL. L. Rsv. 569 (1949).
Decisions reaching a contrary result have generally been confined to peculiar fact
situations. E.g., Mason v. Mallard Telephone Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671
(1932) (small, privately-held local telephone company threatened with competition
from larger companies); 68 Beacon Street, Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E.
303 (1935) (cooperative apartment house); Davis v. Proprietors of The Second
Universalist Meeting House, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 321 (1844) (religious organization) ;
Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11
N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939) (cooperative apartment house); Wright v. Iredell Telephone
Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744 (1921) (local telephone company). Cf., Weisner
v. 791 Park Avenue Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1958), noted in
25 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 323 (1959) (cooperative apartment house), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 N.Y. 2d 426, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959). Other decisions involve farmers' co-
operatives, which may be organized under special statutes permitting restrictions on
transfer of shares to non-members. Healey v. Steele Center Creamery Ass'n., 115
Minn. 451, 133 N.W. 69 (1911); Chaffee v. Farmers' Co-operative Elevator Co.,
39 N.D. 585, 168 N.W. 616 (1918). But see Herring v. Ruskin Co-op. Ass'n., 52
S.W. 327 (Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1899). In Massachusetts, absolute restrictions on
transfer may be enforceable due, at least in part, to a statutory provision which has
been construed as impliedly authorizing them and to the tendency of the courts to
give effect to the restriction, if at all possible, as a contract between the stockholders.
See note 15 supra and Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914).
The court in the Longyear case drew an interesting but doubtful analogy between
restrictions on transfers of stock and of church pews. Restraints with respect to the
latter are apparently enforceable in Massachusetts. Crocker v. Old South Society,
106 Mass. 489 (1871) ; French v. Old South Society, 106 Mass. 479 (1871).
21. Fisher v. Bush, 35 Hun. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885); White v. Ryan, 15
Pa. County Ct. 170 (1894); In re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401, 29 N.W. 582 (1886). Cf.,
Mann v. Schuman, 1 App. Div. 2d 678, 146 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1955). But see Hey v.
Dolphin, 92 Hun. 230, 36 N.Y. Supp. 627 (Sup. Ct. 1895), where the stock was
issued to two stockholders as joint owners and the court, following a dictum in
Fisher v. Bush, supra at 643, upheld the restriction, drawing an analogy between
this situation and a partnership. If the stock is issued to a holding company, its
stockholders may agree that the stock of the subsidiary may not be disposed of
without their consent. Baum v. Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 197, 62 N.W.2d 864
(1954), but it is doubtful that a similar restriction could be placed upon the stock
of the holding company itself. Somewhat the same result may be achieved by means
of a voting trust. See Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct.
1949).
22. See, e.g., Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181
S.W. 1066 (1916) (restriction invalid). The same effect may be achieved by means
of an option to purchase, exercisable upon the stockholders proposing to sell to an
outsider. If cast in this form, the restriction would be upheld in a majority of
jurisdictions, at least if it were contained in the charter, and even if it were merely
a by-law it might be enforceable as a contract between those stockholders who had
assented to it. See cases cited in notes 28-30, infra. Gray suggested that a distinction
might be made between a restriction on transfer to certain designated individuals and
a restriction on transfer to all persons other than a selected few. Certainly the'
latter type of restriction is considerably closer than the former to an. absolute
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providing for an option in favor of the corporation or its stockholders
to purchase stock upon the happening of some event in the future,
such as a proposal by a stockholder to sell to a third party,23 his
voluntary or involuntary termination of employment,24 death,25 or
removal to another geographical locale,2" are generally considered
valid if reasonable. This distinction seems fundamentally sound, since
restrictions of the "first refusal" variety are not so much restraints as
they are options exercisable upon the happening of a condition sub-
sequent. As such, they seem less repugnant to any policy which may
be thought to exist with respect to restraints on transfer generally,
provided of course that they are reasonable and not so bur-
densome in nature that, for all practical purposes they have the
effect of absolute restraints. But nonetheless, some of the early
holdings invalidated even the "first refusal" type of restriction, particu-
larly if the option were contained only in the by-laws27 and not in the
restraint and thus is more arguably invalid. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 30.
The distinction seems to have been recognized only indirectly by the cases in the
general rule that, the more burdensome the restriction, the more likely it is to be
declared invalid.
23. This seems to be the most frequently used form of restriction. See, e.g.,
Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 At. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
24. Lawrence v. Sudman, 70 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (agreement between
corporation and employee stockholders upheld) ; Lawson v. Household Finance Corp.,
supra note 23 (charter provision upheld) ; Douglas v. Aurora Daily News Co., 160
Ill. App. 506 (1911) (provision in stock certificate upheld, except for restriction pro-
hibiting transfer without consent of board of directors, which was declared invalid) ;
Prindiville v. Johnson & Higgins, 92 N.J. Eq. 515, 113 At. 915 (Ch. 1921), aff'd,
93 N.J. Eq. 425, 116 Atl. 785 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922). Contra, Greene v. E. H.
Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1938).
25. New England Trust Co. v. Spaulding, 310 Mass. 424, 38 N.E.2d 672 (1941);
Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938) ; Feldstein's Estate, 25
Pa. Dist. 602 (Orphan's Ct. 1915). All of the foregoing involved by-law provisions
which were held to be enforceable. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch.
343, 152 At. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930), sustained the validity of a charter provision.
Agreements between stockholders having the same effect have been upheld also. Krebs
v. McDonald's Ex'x., 266 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) ; Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust
Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940). Generally restrictions of this type have been
held not testamentary in character and thus not invalid merely because of failure to
comply with statutes regulating wills and similar dispositions taking effect at or after
death. See O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 HARv. L. REv. 773, 782 n.43 (1952).
26. Cf., Adams v. Protective Union Co., 210 Mass. 172, 96 N.E. 74 (1911)
(by-law giving option to purchase in case of death of stockholder or his removal
from the City of Worcester).
27. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust & Savings Co. v. Home Lumber Co.,
118 Mo. 447, 24 S.W. 129 (1893) ; Robertson v. L. Nicholes Co., 141 Misc. 660,
253 N.Y. Supp. 76 (Munic. Ct. 1931); Ireland v. Globe Milling & Reduction Co.,
19 R.I. 180, 32 At. 921 (1895); Petre v. Bruce, 157 Tenn. 131, 7 S.W.2d 43
(1928). Cf., Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 At. 1127 (1896).
Contra, Shumaker v. Utex Exploration Co., 157 F. Supp. 68 (D. Utah 1957);
Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932); Evans v. Dennis, 203 Ga.
232, 46 S.E.2d 122 (1948) ; People v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924) ; Doss v.
Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930); Model Clothing House v.
Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920) ; Elson v. Schmidt, 140 Neb. 646,
1 N.W.2d 314 (1941) ; Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (Ch.
1924); Hassel v. Pohle, 214 App. Div. 654, 212 N.Y. Supp. 561 (1925); Cowles v.
Cowles Realty Co., 201 App. Div. 460, 194 N.Y. Supp. 546 (1922) ; Nicholson v.
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charter.28 The reasoning in many of these opinions is confused, since the
question of whether the restriction is binding upon those who have not
consented to it (where, for example, a by-law is adopted by a majority of
stockholders over the protest of the minority) is obviously distinct from
the question of whether the restriction should bind those who have con-
sented, and yet there seems to be a tendency to give as a reason for de-
claring a restriction invalid the fact that it is merely a by-law and, not a
charter provision. A much more desirable result has been reached in a
number of decisions which have enforced by-laws on a contractual basis
among those stockholders who have consented to them.29 A logical ex-
tension of this reasoning is that the restriction need not be cast in the
form of a by-law if it meets the essential requirements of a valid agree-
ment among stockholders3" and, conversely, the fact that an agreement
appears in the form of a by-law is no impediment to its validity, except
with regard to those who have not consented.
Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910). Cf., Elson v. Security
State Bank, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.W.2d 525 (1954) (dictum). In Massachusetts,
by-law provisions of this type have been held valid with little question. Barrett v.
King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902), is the leading case. See also Fopiano
v. Italian Catholic Cemetery Ass'n, 260 Mass. 99, 156 N.E. 708 (1927). Cf., Albert
E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928); Fairfield Holding
Corp. v. Souther, 258 Mass. 540, 155 N.E. 639 (1927).
28. Charter provisions were held valid in the following early cases: Prindi-
ville v. Johnson & Higgins, 92 N.J. Eq. 515, 113 Atl. 915 (Ch. 1921), aff'd 93 N.J. Eq.
425, 116 Atl. 785 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922) ; Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646,
177 N.Y. Supp. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co.. 159 Wis.
517, 149 N.W. 754 (1914); Farmers' Mercantile & Supply Co. v. Laun, 146 Wis.
252, 131 N.W. 366 (1911). Contra, Lufkin Rule Co. v. Secretary of State, 163
Mich. 30,. 127 N.W. 784 (1910). The following are some representative recent
cases upholding the validity of charter provisions: Weissmann v. Lincoln Corp., 76
So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1954) ; McDonald v. Farley & Loetscher Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53,
283 N.W. 261 (1939), noted in 52 HARV. L. REv. 850 (1939) and 23 MINN. L. REv.
834 (1939); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of
American Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953) ; Monotype Composi-
tion Co. v. Kiernan, 319 Mass. 456, 66 N.E.2d 565 (1946) ; State v. Sho-Me Power
Cooperative, 356 Mo. 832, 204 S.W.2d 276 (1947).
29. Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 Ati. 391 (1929);
First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio Op. 359, 73 N.E.2d 93 (C.P. 1945). If the
by-law is enforced as a contract, it becomes academic in most instances to pass on
its validity as a by-law. See Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951) ;
New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894) ; Weiland
v. Hogan, 177 Mich. 626, 143 N.W. 599 (1913) ; Elson v. Schmidt, 140 Neb. 646, 1
N.W.2d 314 (1941) ; Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Borrowe, 71 N.H. 69, 51 Atl.
670 (1901) ; Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957);
Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909). And see
additional cases in note 27 Supra.
30. Weissmann v. Lincoln Corp., 76 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1954) ; Arentsen v. Sherman
Towel Service Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933) ; Douglas v. Aurora Daily
News Co., 160 Ill. App. 506 (1911); Jones v. Brown, 171 Mass. 318, 50 N.E. 648
(1898); Scruggs, Vandervoort & Barney Bank v. International Shoe Co., 227 Mo.
App. 378, 52 S.W.2d 1027 (1932); Scruggs v. Cotterill, 67 App. Div. 583, 73 N.Y.
Supp. 882 (1902); Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 Atl. 488 (1903) ; Coleman
v. Kettering, 289 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). Cf., Warner & Swasey Co. v.
Rusterholz, 41 F. Supp. 498 (D. Minn. 1941) (provision in trust instrument);
Brown v. Britton, 41 App. Div. 57, 58 N.Y. Supp. 353 (1899).
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Assuming, then, that the current weight of authority is correct in
enforcing so-called "first refusal" provisions, except with regard
to non-consenting stockholders, whether they appear in the charter,
by-laws, or a stockholders' agreement, there is of course an added
requirement that the restriction be "reasonable" and not unduly burden-
some or oppressive. This test of "reasonableness" is easy to state and,
superficially speaking, easy of application. Beyond that, its usefulness
as a criterion for determining the validity of restrictions seems some-
what doubtful. One of the best known cases, Lawson v. Household
Finance Corporation,3 is an illustration of this. The case concerned a
"first refusal" type restriction in the certificate of incorporation and
by-laws of a corporation which permitted it to repurchase its shares at
a value, excluding good will, to be determined by appraisers. In holding
the restriction valid, the court referred to Section 121 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 2 providing that a corporation shall "ex-
ercise all the powers . . . expressly given in its charter or in its
certificate under which it was incorporated, so far as the same are
necessary or convenient to the attainment of the objects set forth in
such charter or certificate of incorporation. . . ." The problem, in the
court's view, was whether the restriction could be considered "neces-
sary or convenient" to the attainment of the objects set forth in the
certificate of incorporation. The restriction was held to be "necessary
or convenient," since it was conducive to the development of experi-
enced and trustworthy management personnel by providing them with
an interest in the business (the making of loans), which the court
described as "precarious" in nature.3 3 The court analyzed the existing
cases in terms of "reasonable" and "unreasonable" restraints and con-
cluded that the restriction in question was not only "necessary or con-
venient" but "reasonable" as well.
Aside from characterizing various restraints as "reasonable" or
"unreasonable," the reasoning of the Lawson case is not particularly
helpful as a guide to determine whether a particular restriction is valid
or invalid. Query whether the court would have reached a different
conclusion if the defendant had not been engaged in the business of
making loans but had been involved in an enterprise of a less "pre-
carious" nature. In addition, the court compounded the confusion of
its analysis by providing an alternative basis for the decision, holding
that the charter provision was binding as a contract between the com-
31. 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 At. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930), noted in 78 U. PA. L. Rzv.
422 (1930) (lower court opinion) and 16 VA. L. Rzv. 289 (1930).
32. DEL. COvZ ANN. tit. 8, § 121 (1955).
33. 17 Del. Ch. 343, 350, 152 At. 723, 726 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
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pany and its stockholders and citing as authority Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward.4 Obviously there was no lack of authority in
addition to the Dartmouth College case to support the holding in this
respect, and the court seemed to be well aware of this, 5 but the
alternative basis for the decision seems unnecessary and confusing,
although perhaps justified by precedent if isolated from the rest of the
opinion. If anything, the implication was that a charter provision
which fails in some way to meet the test of being "necessary or
convenient" or "reasonable" may yet be upheld solely due to its
presence in the charter, as a contract binding upon the company and
its stockholders. Are all charter provisions valid on this theory? If not,
what determines their validity? Very likely the court did not intend
to imply that "unreasonable" restrictions could be enforced on a con-
tractual basis if they appear in the charter. On the other hand, it
seems doubtful that the holding implies that the restriction must be
not only "reasonable" but in the charter as well. Added to this is
the problem of how one determines whether a particular provision is
"reasonable" or "necessary or convenient." The resulting confusion
and the number of questions left unanswered leave some doubt whether
the Lawson holding succeeded in clarifying the existing law or did
nothing more than muddy the waters.
The Lawson case was followed by another interesting decision
which may have clarified the law somewhat, Greene v. E.H. Rollins &
Sons. 6 There the restriction, in addition to a "first refusal" feature,
contained a provision purporting to give the corporation a right to
purchase at any time any of its common stock, not owned or held
by an employee, at "asset value," exclusive of good will or going con-
cern value. Certain shares of common were expressly excluded from
the effect of the restriction, namely those which might be issued
upon conversion of the company's preferred stock and the first 30,000
shares of common which might otherwise be issued, the latter to be
made subject to the restriction only after a given date. The court
held the provision invalid and distinguished the Lawson case on the
ground that "special circumstances" had there made the restraint
reasonable, whereas Greene had features which were not present in
Lawson. "Had it not been for the special circumstances involved in
that case," the court said, "we must infer that even the milder clause
34. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517 (1819).
35. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 352, 152 At. 723,
727 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
36. 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1938), noted in 37 MicH. L. Rsv. 1140(1939), 87 U. PA. L. Rzv. 482 (1939) and 25 VA. L. Rnv. 489 (1939).
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there involved would have been declared to constitute an unlawful
restraint upon alienation.""7  It was emphasized that, in Greene, a
portion of the common stock was expressly excluded from the re-
striction, and that the resulting scheme had no relation to any plan
of identifying management personnel and employees with ownership.
In addition, the court thought that the restraint in Lawson differed
substantially from that involved in Greene since the latter had the
effect of subjecting a non-employee stockholder to an indefinite call
on his stock in favor of the corporation, which would invariably render
the stock less attractive to prospective purchasers and constitute an
undue burden."8 Finally, and what is perhaps most significant of all
in view of the prior Lawson holding, the fact that the restriction was
contained in the certificate of incorporation did not, in the court's
view, prevent it from being held invalid if contrary to public policy. 9
The Lawson and Greene cases are significant not only as being
fairly representative of the way in which stock transfer restrictions
are now being dealt with in the courts but as illustrating some of the
main difficulties involved in determining the validity of particular
restrictions. The "reasonableness" test adopted by the court in
Lawson was hardly an innovation in this area of the law,4° but the
holding, at least when interpreted in the light of the subsequent
Greene decision, suggests that a restriction may be reasonable and
valid with respect to the affairs of one company and yet unreasonable
and invalid with respect to the affairs of another. Reasonableness as
a criterion seems to be little more than a judicial determination to
resolve each new situation in terms of prevailing equities and, in
view of the almost endless variety of possible restrictions and the
infinite number of situations in which they may be applied, there is
little to guide an attorney in advising his client concerning the validity
of particular restrictions. In fact, if Greene is to be taken at its face
value, even a "first refusal" option contained in the corporate charter
may be invalid in the absence of "special circumstances," such as those
present in Lawson, and the restriction might not be enforceable even
as a contract between stockholders who have assented to it if contrary
to "public policy."
"37. Id. at 404, 2 A.2d at 254.
38. Id. at 402, 2 A.2d at 253. The restriction in Lawson applied only to a stock-
holder who ceased to be a director, officer, employee or agent, an executor or
administrator of a deceased holder, and a purchaser of shares sold on execution orjudicial sale. In addition, the'term of the option was limited to twenty days after
notice to the corporation of the value of the shares as determined by the appraisers.
39. Id. at 399, 2 A.2d at 251-52.
40. See, e.g., Fisher v. Bush, 35 Hun. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885).
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In determining fairness or reasonableness, no one characteristic
of the restriction is necessarily determinative. For example, mere
disparity between the option price and the current value of the stock
subject to a "first refusal" type restriction does not establish unfair-
ness.4 One court has suggested that the difference must be "so great
as to lead to a reasonable conclusion of fraud, mistake, or concealment
in the nature of fraud."42 But if an option exercisable in favor of a
corporation at the original cost to the stockholder of his investment
is not "fraud,"43 it is difficult to conceive of a restriction which would
be held invalid due to mere inadequacy of price.
Further uncertainties arise from the possibility that the validity
of particular restrictions may be established only with respect to the
specific fact situation in which the restriction is applied. Despite the
suggestion of the court in Palmer v. Chamberlin"' that the validity of a
contract should be decided "not merely by what has been done under
the contract, but by what may be done under it,"" a Massachusetts
court recently upheld a charter provision permitting a corporation to
purchase all or any of its common stock at any time at "book value."4
The possibilities of oppressive use of such a provision by those in control
of the corporation to squeeze out minority interests are obvious 4 7 and
41. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957).
See Note, 72 HARV. L. Rev. 555, 557 (1959), suggesting that, to the extent of the
spread between the market and the option prices, a restriction may approach an
absolute restraint, at least if there -s a likelihood that subsequent purchasers may be
bound, since, the more burdensome the restriction, the more unmarketable the stock
will become. See also, Note, 57 COLUM. L. Riv. 444 (1957). For an interesting
and extensive discussion of various methods of determining the purchase price of
securities subject to a "first option" see O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock
in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. Rtv. 773, 798
(1952).
42. Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 541 (5th Cir. 1951), noted in 38
VA. L. Riv. 103 (1952).
43. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957).
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 1951).
46. Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1954).
The Hood case is noted in the following: 35 B.U.L. Riv. 190 (1955) ; 43 Gao. L.J.
302 (1955); 68 HARV. L. Rtv. 1240 (1955); 54 MIcH. L. Rtv. 132 (1955); 34
Nun. L. Rev. 717 (1955) ; 50 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 558 (1955) ; 103 U. PA. L. Rev. 819
(1955). See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 392 (1956). Callable common stock is not
permitted in England. See Gower supra note 6, at 1378.
47. See Note, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 558 (1955). A similar charter provision was
held invalid in Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch.
1938). Cf., Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 Atd. 887
(Ch. 1937), aff'd per curiam, 21 Del. Ch. 431, 2 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Agree-
ments, as distinct from charter or by-law provisions, among stockholders or between
them and the corporation providing for an option to repurchase stock at any time
have been enforced in at least two cases. Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210
N.W. 209 (1926) ; Boggs v. Boggs & Buhl, 217 Pa. 10, 66 At. 105 (1907). In the
Boggs case, the option was exercisable upon a finding by a majority of stockholders
that one of their number had "ceased to be a desirable associate either on account
of incompetency or personal conduct." The court acknowledged the requirement that
the finding must have been made in good faith but held that this had been done
and enforced the option.
FALL 1960]
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss1/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
yet the court, relying on a finding of fact that the directors had acted in
good faith, observed that "even a valid provision cannot be exercised
oppressively or for the purpose of discriminating against a single
stockholder or group of stockholders,"4 implying, if anything, that
charter provisions are, in themselves, neither valid nor invalid, but
are only enforceable as applied to specific fact situations. Thus an
option to purchase common stock "at any time" may be enforceable
under some circumstances and unenforceable under other circum-
stances.49
In view of the uncertainties and inconsistencies which have re-
sulted from judicial efforts to determine the validity of restraints from
the standpoint of a supposed "public policy" which has itself never
been fully analyzed or enunciated, it seems desirable that the rules in
this area be clarified by legislation. At a very minimum, in states
which already have statutes expressly relating to restraints,50 existing
policies should be clarified and the statutes made more explicit. Legis-
lative inaction can only lead to a continuation of the present judicial
tendency to justify decisions in terms of statutory provisions which
were scarcely designed for the purposes for which they are being used.
Among the basic interests which should be taken into considera-
tion in drafting legislation in this area are (1) rights of transferees
who lack notice of restrictions, (2) rights of creditors and holders of
securities having priorities with respect to stock on which the restraint
may be imposed, and (3) rights of minority stockholders.
The provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act5 protect the
interests of transferees to some extent but they are by no means a
complete safeguard. The fact that notice of the restriction appears on
the stock certificate does not necessarily mean that the purchaser will
in every instance be aware of the restriction, since the certificate may
very well be delivered several days, or even weeks, subsequent to the
date of the transaction and payment of the purchase price. If any-
thing, the requirement of notice on the certificate has been useful in
providing courts with a rationale for deciding in favor of the transferee
when the statute has not been complied with and, conversely, refusing
48. Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 675, 121 N.E.2d 850, 853
(1954).
49. See Note, 34 NEB. L. REv. 717, 720 (1955), suggesting that "The pre-
rogatives of ownership should be determinable at the time of purchase, by resort
to the terms of the restrictions; while under the rule of the [Hood] case, i.e., where
provisions are not invalid per se, they would be 'indefinite until the provision had
been litigated."
50. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-16(c), 55-45(a) (1959 Cum. Supp.)
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.11 (B) (8). (Baldwin 1955). One of the most com-
prehensive provisions may be found in the new Tex. Bus. Corp. Act, art. 2.22 (1956).
51. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER Acr § 15.
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him relief when, after having received a certificate with notice on it,
he has failed to make timely protest either to his transferor or to the
corporation. 2 Most of these difficulties would be avoided by a require-
ment that the certificate not only contain a notice of the restriction but
that it be delivered immediately upon, or prior to, the payment of
the purchase price. However, to make the validity of the restriction
depend upon the time of delivery of the certificate would be to en-
able the transferor to sell the stock free of the restriction merely by
failing to part with the certificate until after the sale. Another possi-
bility would be to impose a duty on the transferor to notify the
corporation of the proposed transfer prior to the date of the sale in
order that the corporation or its stockholders may give the transferee
notice of the restriction before he has suffered a change of position by
paying the purchase price or otherwise committing himself. But essen-
tially the same difficulty as that suggested above would arise upon failure
of the transferor to give the required notice. In any case the latter may
of course be liable to the transferee in damages for breach of contract,
deceit, or on some other theory but he would doubtless be liable, or
could be made to rescind the sale, even in the absence of a statute, and,
in addition, the purchaser's remedy against his seller is likely to be
inadequate in many instances. The fundamental difficulty is that all of
the above devices place a duty on the transferor of giving notice of
the restriction, and he is precisely the person who is least likely to
give it. The corporation or its stockholders cannot give notice until
they in turn have been notified of the proposed sale by the transferor.
To impose on the transferee a duty to obtain the certificate con-
temporaneously with the sale is another possibility, but this seems
somewhat inconsistent with the way in which stock transfers are fre-
52. If the restriction is not referred to on the certificate, it is generally re-
garded as unenforceable even against a transferee with notice of the restriction.
Security Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, 251 Ala. 508, 38 So. 2d 274 (1949),
noted in 48 MICH. L. Rgv. 123 (1949); Age Publishing Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo.
319, 134 P.2d 205 (1943); Sorrick v. Consolidated Telephone Co., .340 Mich. 463,
65 N.W.2d 713 (1954), noted in 53 MICH. L. Rtv. 620 (1955) and 8 VAND. L. Rev.
640 (1955) ; Costello v. Farrell, 234 Minn. 453, 48 N.W.2d 557 (1951), noted in
36 MINN. L. Rgv. 269 (1952) ; Hopwood v. Topsham Telephone Co., 120 Vt. 97,
132 A.2d 170 (1957), noted in 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 567 (1957) and 17 MD. L. REv.
353 (1957). Cf., Prudential Petroleum Corp. v. Rauscher, Pierce & Co., 281 S.W.2d
457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) ; Larson v. Superior Auto Parts, Inc., 270 Wis. 613, 72
N.W.2d 316 (1955) (dictum); In re Magnetic Mfg. Co., 201 Wis. 154, 229 N.W. 544(1930) (dictum). Earlier decisions going the other way, such as Doss v. Yingling,
95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930), noted in 17 VA. L. Riv. 293 (1931), and
Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (Ch. 1924), have generally
been distinguished on the ground that the transferee occupied a fiduciary status due to
his position as an officer or director of the company. The results reached in the
majority of cases are probably defensible in view of the language of the statute.
Query, however, whether the statute should be interpreted as having any significance
other than to require notice of the restriction on the certificate, as distinct from
constituting an implicit legislative sanction of "reasonable" restrictions.
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quently handled as a practical matter. Perhaps the only satisfactory
solution would be some form of public record of the restriction which
would be a condition of its validity and would bind all parties re-
gardless of failure on anyone's part to give or to obtain actual notice.
This in turn suggests that the restriction should be set forth in the
corporate charter and publicly recorded.
The rights of creditors and holders of senior securities and. the
means whereby those rights may be protected depend upon considera-
tions which extend beyond the area of stock transfer restrictions and
involve not only limitations on the purchase by a corporation of its
own shares, but redemptions, dividends, partial liquidations and any
other means whereby the "cushion" of corporate assets relied upon for
protection may be diminished. Obviously, to the extent that a re-
striction on transfer gives rights to the stockholders directly, and not
to or through the corporation, the holders of senior securities will
have less reason to require notice or to object to the proposed enforce-
ment of the restriction. Their rights vis-h-vis the corporation may be,
and frequently are, set forth with some particularity in the corporate
charter, indenture, or other instrument pursuant to which the securities
have been issued, and it would seem that this is the most appropriate
method of achieving the desired degree of protection. 8
53. In addition, there has been some measure of judicial protection to the extent
that corporations may be prohibited from purchasing their own shares. See, e.g., Steele
v. Farmers' & Merchants' Mutual Telephone Ass'n, 95 Kan. 580, 148 Pac. 661
(1915) ; Petre v. Bruce, 157 Tenn. 131, 7 S.W.2d 43 (1928) ; State ex rel. Howland
v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. 144, 244 Pac. 261 (1926); Kom v. Cody
Detective Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 136 Pac. 1155 (1913). Contra, Harker v. Ralston
Purina Co., 45 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 619 (1931) (Missouri
corporation) ; Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949).
In New York, where stock may be purchased only from "surplus," repurchase
agreements have been declared invalid for lack of mutuality of obligation even though
there may be funds legally available for purchases at the time the repurchase agree-
ment is executed. Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163
N.E. 735 (1928). Query whether the agreement should be enforced if there are
funds legally available for the purchase at the time the option becomes exercisable.
See Note, 11 W. Rps. L. Riy. 278, 283 (1960), suggesting that subsequent New
York cases may have side-stepped the effect of the Topken decision, without ex-
pressly overruling it. One device which has had some measure of success has been
to fund the repurchase price through life insurance. See Greater New York Carpet
House, Inc. v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1940). Section
5.15 of the proposed N.Y. Business Corporation Law, S. Int. 3124, Pr. No. 3316
(1960) provides that agreements of this type shall be enforceable when the corpo-
ration is not insolvent and the cost of the purchase of shares does not exceed the
amount of surplus available therefor or reduce the net assets below the amount
payable to holders of shares having equal or prior liquidation rights. In addition,
a promise by a corporation, made contemporaneously with the issue of its shares, to
repurchase them is enforceable under the above conditions and if it is "part of an
agreement made in furtherance of the business of the corporation and executed by
the corporation with the consent of the holders of a majority of the shares given at a
duly convened meeting." See Rohrlich, New York's Proposed Business Corporation
Law, 15 Ri coRD ov N.Y.C.B.A. 309, 313 (1960).
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Rights of minority stockholders would be best protected by re-
quiring that restrictions be set forth in the corporate charter. Sub-
scribers to an issue of stock would be bound as having acquired a
security which has been made expressly subject to the restriction,
and transferees would be protected by their presumed notice of the
restriction as a matter of public record, as well as actual notice
provided on the certificate itself as now required by the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act.
If a restriction is imposed by means of a charter amendment only
those stockholders who have voted in favor of the amendment should
be bound. 4 Otherwise a stockholder would be subject to having his
interest cut down or burdened with conditions to which he has not
given his assent. A principal difficulty with this approach is that it
might result in two types of stock within a class, one subject to the
restriction and the other freely alienable. An alternative would be to
bind subsequent transferees of the stock of a non-assenting stock-
holder, although the latter might not be bound and could transfer to
anyone regardless of the restriction. However, this would almost
invariably have the effect of restricting the transfer of the stock in the
hands of the non-assenter, since potential purchasers of the stock under
such conditions would be more difficult to find, and its market value
would in all likelihood be adversely affected. There seems to be no
54. See Wentworth v. Russell State Bank, 167 Kan. 246, 205 P.2d 972 (1949).
Cf., Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959),
noted in 14 Sw. L.J. 106 (1960) and 38 TEXAS L. lzv. 499 (1960) (by-law amend-
ment held not to bind non-assenting stockholder whose shares were issued to him
without restriction on transfer). Conversely, once the restriction has been validly
adopted as an amendment to the charter, those who are bound by the restriction
should not be permitted to avoid its effect by a further amendment deleting it.
Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204, 116 S.E. 810 (1923) ; Berger v. Amana
Soc'y, 95 N.W.2d 909 -(Iowa 1959), noted in 45 IOWA L. Rpv. 615 (1960) (re-
striction giving corporation right to purchase, and stockholder right to sell, stock at
"true value" in the event of death, sale or removal to another locality held not sub-ject to modification by amendment so as to require stockholder to receive, instead
of cash, stock of another class on resale of original stock to the corporation);
Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951). O'Neal has
suggested that the corporate charter should provide against its subsequent amendment
in a manner which would delete the restriction. 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.14 (1958 ed.) ; O'NEAL, Restrictions On Transfer Of Stock In
Closely Held Corporations: Planning And Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REv. 773, 786(1952). See N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 9, limiting the duration of such a prohibition
against amendment to a period of ten years. See also Israels, The Close Corpora-
tion And The Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 503 (1948) and Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q.
133, 140 (1958). For an argument that removal of restrictions should, in some in-
stances, be permitted, see Clark, Charter or By-law Amendment to Remove or
Impose Stock Transfer Restrictions, 2 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 1 (1960). The
proposed N.Y. Business Corporation Law apparently permits charter amendments
of all types regardless of whether they are "fundamental" in nature, providing in
certain situations for dissenter's appraisal rights. See sections 8.04(a)(2) and
8.07(a) (6) of the proposed statute, S. Int. 3124, Pr. No. 3316 (1960), and Rohrlich,
New York's Proposed Business Corporation Law, 15 RECORD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 309,
319 (1960).
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theoretical objection to a restriction's being applicable to some but
not all stock in a class and the cases have in fact reached this result
indirectly in holding by-laws valid on a contractual basis between
those who have assented to them, or those who may for various rea-
sons be estopped from objecting to them, and yet not binding on other
stockholders."" From a practical point of view, if the restriction were a
matter of public record, transferees would be on notice of the possi-
bility that transfer of the stock they intend to purchase may be re-
stricted and hence would be under a duty to inquire concerning the
rights of the transferor and his predecessors in interest vis-a-vis the
company and its stockholders. The restriction should be prima facie
applicable to all of the shares of a class, and the burden should be upon
the transferee or'his successors in interest to establish that his shares
are free of the restriction.
Absolute prohibitions against transfer, or restrictions having the
effect of conditioning the right to transfer upon the consent of one or
more persons, should be permitted if limited in time. At the expira-
tion of a designated period the restriction could be submitted again to
the stockholders and those opposed to it could have their shares re-
leased from its effect. Options to purchase on a "first refusal" basis
upon the happening of specified events, such as death, retirement,
or proposed sale to a non-stockholder, could be unlimited in time since,
unlike an absolute prohibition on transfer, or a requirement of consent,
such restrictions do not have the effect of "freezing in" stockholders
who wish to dispose of their shares and hence put them at the mercy
of the majority, who is thus in a position to impose any conditions it
considers desirable as a price of giving the requisite consent.
It is sometimes suggested that a statute expressly permitting
restrictions on transfer should apply only to certain types of corpora-
tions or be restricted to so-called "private" or close corporations with
a limited number of stockholders.5" This is perhaps more a matter of
policy than anything else but there seems to be no real reason why any
such arbitrary limits should be imposed. As a practical matter, large,
publicly held corporations will seldom seek to restrict transfer of their
55. See cases cited in notes 29 and 30, supra. On the question of estoppel see,
e.g., Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1954), and
Prindiville v. Johnson & Higgins, 92 N.J. Eq. 515, 113 At. 915 (Ch. 1921), aff'd,
93 N.J. Eq. 425, 116 Atl. 785 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922).
56. See, e.g., Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation Law", 28
CORN LL L.Q. 313 (1943), suggesting that special provisions be made applicable to
all corporations whose stock is owned by not more than five persons. Compare this
approach with that taken in civil law countries such as France and Belgium, as
described by Winer on page 330 of the article, and also with that taken in Great
Britain with respect to the so-called "private company." 6 Halsbury's Laws of
England § 526 (3d ed. 1954). See also Gower, supra note .5, at 1378.
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shares in view of the obvious difficulties of administration, listing
requirements on stock exchanges and, what is perhaps the fundamental
reason, the fact that the necessity for imposing a restriction is less
likely to exist where the stock is not closely held and is already in the
hands of an appreciable number of "outsiders." In such cases, the
majority stockholders are more likely to resort to other methods of
insuring perpetuation of control, such as voting trusts, pooling agree-
ments, irrevocable proxies and the like.57
Given the above assumptions, it would seem that most types of
restrictions should be permitted. In any event, it would be well that
supposed considerations of "public policy" in promoting free transfer
of stock be crystallized in statutory form, perhaps along the lines sug-
gested above, which would remove the uncertainties of the now out-
worn prohibition against "unreasonable" restraints. For the most
part such a statute, in its result, would not differ radically from the
net effect of the existing case law, except that vague criteria such as
"reasonableness" and "convenience or necessity" would become in-
applicable. Accordingly, a restriction would be considered enforceable
upon compliance with the statutory conditions and any uncertainties
arising from the possibility that a court might subsequently determine
the restriction to be invalid as applied to a particular fact situation or
business context would be eliminated.
The following is an illustration of what might be done in the way
of drafting a statutory provision codifying some of the principles
outlined above. Perhaps whatever deficiencies it may have will en-
courage another to draft an improved version which may eventually
result in legislation:
"No restriction on transfer of stock shall be enforceable unless
(1) it shall be set forth in the certificate of incorporation, and
(2) it shall be set forth in full or in substance upon the certifi-
cate evidencing such stock, or satisfactory reference made upon
such certificate to the appropriate portions of the certificate of
incorporation containing such restriction and the place where
such certificate of incorporation may be made available for in-
spection, provided however, that a failure to comply with sub-
division (2) of the foregoing shall not render such restriction
unenforceable with regard to a stockholder or transferee having
actual notice of the restriction at the time he acquired such stock.
Notwithstandivg any other provisions of this [Section,
Article],
57. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Proceedings, Texas Business
Corporation Act Institute, 144-45 (1955).
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(a) no restriction having the effect of prohibiting the transfer
of stock, or requiring that any such transfer be conditional upon
the consent of one or more persons other than the holder thereof,
shall be enforceable for a term in excess of 10 years from the date
at which such restriction shall first become effective, except that
such term may be extended for an additional 10 years upon the
written consent or other authorization of a stockholder with re-
spect to any shares held by him, but a stockholder not so con-
senting shall be entitled to transfer or otherwise dispose of his
shares in the same manner as if such restriction had not been in
effect ;
(b) no restriction adopted by an amendment to a certificate of
incorporation shall be enforceable against a stockholder, or his
transferee, legatee, or successor in interest, who shall sustain the
burden of proving that he objected to such amendment in writing
and voted against it at a meeting of stockholders duly called for
consideration;
(c) stockholders may enter into agreements restricting the trans-
fer of their shares and such agreements shall be enforceable between
the parties thereto, but not otherwise except in compliance with the
provisions hereof; and
(d) restrictions adopted or entered into prior to the effective
date of this [Section, Article] shall continue unaffected by the pro-
visions hereof."
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